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The Hon. Bruce Atkinson MLC                                            The Hon. Christine Fyffe MP 
President                                                                              Speaker 
Legislative Council                                                               Legislative Assembly 
Parliament House                                                                Parliament House 
Melbourne                                                                            Melbourne 
 
Dear Presiding Officers 
 
Under the provisions of section 16AB of the Audit Act 1994, I transmit my report on the 
audit Impact of Increased Scrutiny of High Value High Risk Projects.  
The audit assessed the effectiveness of the High Value, High Risk (HVHR) process in 
improving project business cases and procurements so that they provide an adequate 
basis for delivering intended project benefits within approved time lines and cost. 
I found that the Department of Treasury and Finance’s (DTF) increased scrutiny of 
High Value High Risk projects has made a difference to the quality of the business 
cases and procurements underpinning government's infrastructure investments. 
However, these improvements have not lifted practices so that they consistently and 
comprehensively meet DTF's better practice guidelines.  
This means government is still exposed to the risk that projects fail to deliver intended 
benefits on time and within approved budgets. This risk is most significant in DTF’s 
assessment of the deliverability of projects’ benefits where its scrutiny is clearly 
inadequate.  
I have made eight recommendations aimed at improving the coverage, rigour of 
scrutiny, management and evaluation of the HVHR process. 
Yours faithfully 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
26 June 2014  
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Auditor-General’s comments 
Parliament and the community rightly expect that publicly-funded capital 
investments are planned and managed in a way that delivers predicted benefits on 
time and within allocated budgets.  
It is critical that government is fully and reliably informed about projects’ costs and 
benefits, and the risks affecting these before deciding what to do. The 
consequences of failing to do this, especially for high value projects, are 
significant—unexpected cost blow-outs affect the government’s ability to deliver its 
wider policy agenda, unforeseen delays mean the community has to wait longer for 
promised benefits, and unreliable benefit estimates risk distorting government’s 
decision-making. 
VAGO’s publication Reflections on audits 2006–2012: Lessons from the past, 
challenges for the future identified poor business case development, including 
gaps in the information underpinning decisions, and the inadequate consideration 
of available procurement options as recurring shortcomings.  
The government introduced the High Value High Risk (HVHR) process to more 
rigorously review business cases and procurements to provide it with more 
certainty that claimed benefits could be delivered within the time lines and costs 
estimated by proponents. 
I am pleased that government has recognised this gap and that the Department of 
Treasury and Finance (DTF) has improved business cases by applying greater 
scrutiny to agencies’ estimates of costs and time lines, and their analyses of risks.  
However, the HVHR process as currently applied falls short of consistently 
providing the level and quality of assurance government needs to be fully informed 
when deciding whether and how to invest.  
While my report describes the gaps we found and how DTF should address these, 
two areas of particular concern are, firstly, the absence of any meaningful scrutiny 
of project benefits and, secondly, the inconsistent coverage of projects costing 
more than $100 million. 
On the first point, DTF’s scrutiny of project benefits is insufficient to assure 
government that these benefits are deliverable. The business cases we reviewed 
did not include all the information needed to understand and verify the benefits 
claimed. This is clearly not adequate. 
  
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
Audit team 
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Sector Director 
Tony Brown 
Team Leader 
Michelle Tolliday 
Manager 
Sid Nair 
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Our previous audit findings highlight that much greater scrutiny of claimed benefits 
is required. For example VAGO’s:  
x 2010 audit, Management of Major Rail Projects, found that the quality 
assurance underpinning final business cases, including the documentation of 
project benefits, was inadequate. 
x 2011 audit, Management of Major Road Projects, found that shortcomings in 
how agencies forecast traffic and estimated benefits risked them 
overestimating benefits and giving decision-makers false confidence about 
the capacity of projects to cope with future traffic. 
The continuing lack of adequate scrutiny of project benefits needs to be addressed. 
It raises the risk of government investing substantial sums in projects without 
understanding whether the projected benefits are well founded or achievable.  
On the second point, we identified projects worth billions of dollars that are not 
following the standard HVHR process of having a DTF-reviewed and 
Treasurer-approved business case before being considered for funding. These 
include major road and rail projects, funded as part of the government’s 2014 
election commitments, and projects funded as unsolicited bids. 
I have asked DTF to keep me informed about how it will achieve the level of 
scrutiny and assurance needed to properly inform government decisions about 
these projects. 
I note DTF's positive response to the audit recommendations. Given the 
importance of this area, I plan to conduct one performance audit each year on the 
HVHR process to track DTF’s progress and identify emerging issues. 
I would like to thank DTF, the Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure, the Department of Health, VicRoads and Public Transport Victoria 
for their assistance and cooperation during this audit. 
 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
June 2014 
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Audit summary 
Background 
In Victoria, the total value of public sector capital investments underway or 
commencing in 2014–15 is around $72 billion, including projects delivered as public 
private partnerships. This includes a commitment made in the 2014–15 Budget of up to 
$27 billion to build new road and rail infrastructure such as the $8 billion to $10 billion 
stage 2 of the East West Link and the $8.5 billion to $11 billion Melbourne Rail Link. 
Previous VAGO and Ombudsman reviews have found that significant flaws with project 
business cases and procurement processes have led to cost and time overruns and 
diminished benefits.  
The government adopted the High Value High Risk (HVHR) process in late 2010 
because of past cost overruns of over $2 billion that it attributed to the inadequate 
management of project business cases and procurements. The goal of the HVHR 
process is to achieve more certainty in the delivery of intended benefits in line with 
planned costs and time lines. 
The HVHR process applies to all public sector infrastructure and information and 
communications technology investments that are likely to draw on Budget funding that: 
x have a total estimated investment greater than $100 million, or 
x are identified as high risk using an approved risk assessment tool, or 
x are determined by government as warranting the rigour of increased oversight. 
HVHR investments are subject to extra scrutiny by the Department of Treasury and 
Finance (DTF), together with additional Treasurer's approvals at key milestones 
covering the business case and procurement, and monitoring after the procurement 
decision. HVHR reviews started in 2011 to cover projects in the 2012–13 Budget cycle. 
This audit examined the effectiveness of the HVHR process in improving project 
business cases and procurements so that they provide an adequate basis for 
delivering intended project benefits within approved time lines and costs. We assessed 
whether the process has: 
x been applied as intended to assess business cases, procurement approaches 
and contractual and governance arrangements for all relevant HVHR projects 
x resulted in improved business cases that provide a comprehensive and rigorous 
basis for government project decisions 
x resulted in improved procurements and, ultimately, better outcomes. 
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We examined the application of the process for five projects valued at $936 million: 
x the registration and licensing system (RandL) 
x Mitcham Road and Rooks Road rail grade separations 
x Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital redevelopment 
x Western Highway duplication from Beaufort to Buangor 
x regional rolling stock purchase. 
Towards the end of the audit we examined a further three projects to assess the impact 
of DTF updating its business case assessment template in late 2012. 
Conclusion 
Based on our review of these projects, DTF's increased scrutiny applied through the 
HVHR process has made a difference to the quality of the business cases and 
procurements underpinning government's infrastructure investments. However, DTF 
has not yet started formally evaluating the impacts of the application of the HVHR 
process on project outcomes.  
These improvements have not lifted practices so that they consistently and 
comprehensively meet DTF's better practice guidelines. This means government is still 
exposed to the risk that projects fail to deliver intended benefits on time and within 
approved budgets. A robust HVHR process is critical to effectively managing this risk. 
DTF's scrutiny and assurance of HVHR projects was not applied comprehensively or 
consistently across all the 'deliverability' criteria. Its performance was best when 
assuring project costs, time lines and agencies' approaches to risk management. It 
was more mixed for procurement, governance and project management, and clearly 
inadequate when assuring the expected project benefits. Of particular concern was the 
lack of substantive HVHR review of project benefits, given that none of the business 
cases adequately justified these. 
This audit identified gaps and inconsistencies in DTF's approach to identifying projects 
that should be subject to HVHR review, specifically in relation to small value projects 
that may have high risks and projects that were delivered outside of the general 
government sector.  
It also identified the need for more comprehensive assessment guidance for HVHR 
analysts, the application of a standardised file structure and comprehensive central 
register for managing reviews and the need for better identification and management 
of potential conflicts of interest. 
The RandL project is one of the projects this audit examined in detail. It is the type of 
complex project that HVHR is meant to deal with and an example of a project where 
significant, negative deliverability risks have materialised. While the RandL project 
commenced well before the HVHR process started, the updated 2011 business case 
was subject to an HVHR type review and the project has been monitored under HVHR 
since late 2011.   
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However, neither the management nor oversight applied to the RandL project, 
including HVHR monitoring, was effective in detecting or controlling risks before they 
materialised to significantly delay the project and increase the estimated cost of 
delivery. A key reason for this was the lack of skills and depth of experience needed to 
manage and oversee a complex project of this type.  
The government has now decided to pause the project until February 2015. It is 
currently running at least 18 months late, has cost around $102 million and VicRoads 
has proposed additional expenditure of up to $135 million more than the approved 
budget of $158 million.  
Findings 
Management of the HVHR process 
There is clear scope for DTF to improve how the HVHR process is managed, to make 
it more efficient, transparent and accountable. DTF's May 2012 internal audit and 
VAGO's 2013 audit of the Gateway Review Process recommended changes that DTF 
has not yet fully addressed.  
DTF's HVHR process captures projects valued above $100 million that rely on funding 
from the State Budget. However, the audit identified management weaknesses that 
DTF needs to address, including: 
x acting on VAGO's previous findings about gaps in its approach to assessing 
whether projects valued between $5 to $100 million should be in the HVHR 
process 
x providing criteria for assessing whether non-Budget-funded projects typically 
funded by public corporations should be captured by the HVHR process 
x extending the detailed guidance and templates provided to DTF analysts for 
business case assessments to cover the entire HVHR process 
x better administering the process by applying a standard documentation and 
record-keeping approach to all reviews, and maintaining a master register which 
comprehensively documents review activities 
x improving the collation and communication of lessons learned and better 
practices observed across all HVHR reviews 
x applying an evaluation framework to reliably measure the outcomes of the HVHR 
process and understand further areas for improvement. 
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Improving the quality of reviews 
HVHR business case reviews raised substantive issues and agencies frequently 
modified submissions to address these issues. However, this did not consistently occur 
across all projects nor for all the criteria that DTF uses to test a project's deliverability.  
For four of the five business cases we looked at in detail we saw evidence of: 
x substantive reviews following an HVHR review template 
x DTF identifying and constructively communicating issues to departments 
x responses to DTF's comments providing greater assurance about the rigour of 
the project and in some cases resulting in changes to business cases to reflect 
this information 
x advice to the Treasurer which accurately reflected review findings and 
conclusions.  
However, there is considerable room for DTF to improve its administration and 
oversight of the HVHR process. Some improvements do not require much change—for 
example, making sure that business cases are updated where additional significant 
information is provided. However, other improvements, such as adequately testing the 
reliability of project benefits, require a step change in approach and acquisition of the 
skills needed to do this.  
Recommendations 
Number Recommendation Page 
That the Department of Treasury and Finance: 
1. improves its approach to selecting projects for inclusion in the 
High Value High Risk process by: 
27 
 x systematically reviewing projects between $5 million and 
$100 million to determine whether they should be subject to 
the High Value High Risk process through documented 
reviews of project risk assessments 
 
 x clarifying the criteria for selecting public projects that do not 
require Budget funding for inclusion in the High Value High 
Risk process 
 
 x recommending that projects over $100 million selected 
under the government's unsolicited bids policy be subject to 
High Value High Risk processes 
 
2. develops assessment guidance and templates covering all High 
Value High Risk stages to improve the consistency, rigour and 
transparency of High Value High Risk reviews 
27 
3. improves its administration of the High Value High Risk process 
by: 
27 
 x applying a standardised file structure for managing 
assessment documents and supporting evidence 
 
 x developing and maintaining a comprehensive central register 
of High Value High Risk review activity by project and High 
Value High Risk process stage. 
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Recommendations – continued 
Number Recommendation Page 
That the Department of Treasury and Finance: 
4. improves how it communicates with and informs departments 
by: 
27 
 x developing a structured approach to collating and sharing 
the lessons from all High Value High Risk reviews 
 
 x completing an annual satisfaction survey of agencies that 
have been subject to High Value High Risk reviews 
 
5. identifies potential conflicts of interests of reviewers and 
documents how these are mitigated  
27 
6. develops and applies an evaluation tool to measure the extent 
to which the High Value High Risk process is affecting project 
outcomes 
27 
7. provides greater assurance that High Value High Risk reviews 
comprehensively test compliance with its Investment Lifecycle 
and High Value High Risk Guidelines in areas critical for project 
deliverability 
50 
8. checks that for complex, risky projects—particularly those 
involving information and communications technology 
transformations—the specialist skills needed to successfully 
manage, oversee and quality assure these projects have been 
assessed and acquired. 
50 
Submissions and comments received 
In addition to progressive engagement during the course of the audit, in accordance 
with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report was provided with a 
request for submissions or comments to: 
x Department of Treasury and Finance 
x Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure 
x Department of Health 
x VicRoads 
x Public Transport Victoria. 
Agency views have been considered in reaching our audit conclusions and are 
represented to the extent relevant and warranted in preparing this report. Their full 
section 16(3) submissions and comments are included in Appendix A. 
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1 Background 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Infrastructure planning and delivery 
Effective planning and delivery of major infrastructure projects is critical for 
governments to achieve their policy objectives. In Victoria, the total value of public 
sector capital investments underway or commencing in 2014–15 is around $72 billion.  
The 2014–15 Budget commits up to $27 billion in new infrastructure including: 
x $8.5 billion to $11 billion for the Melbourne Rail Link, which includes a tunnel 
linking Southern Cross and South Yarra stations and a new airport rail link 
x $8 billion to $10 billion to complete the East West Link by extending the eastern 
section from the Tullamarine Freeway to the Western Ring Road 
x $2 billion to $2.5 billion to upgrade the Cranbourne–Pakenham Rail Corridor 
x $850 million to widen the Tullamarine Freeway approaches to the airport. 
 
Southern Cross Station. 
This substantial investment requires effective oversight. However, reviews by VAGO 
and the Ombudsman found that significant flaws with project business cases and 
procurements have led to cost and time overruns as well as diminished or unclear 
benefits. These findings highlight the critical importance of the more stringent review 
processes examined here. 
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1.1.2 Goal of the HVHR process  
In late 2010 the government introduced the High Value High Risk (HVHR) process to 
address issues related to inadequate project management that resulted in cost 
overruns of $2 billion. The goal of the HVHR process is to achieve more certainty in 
the delivery of intended benefits to planned costs and time lines through more rigorous 
review of business cases and procurements. 
By 2008 the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) had developed Investment 
Lifecycle Guidelines that were mandated for investments over $5 million. Since 2010, 
these guidelines have been updated so that they support the development of business 
cases, which are mandatory for capital investments with a total estimated investment 
of $10 million or more. DTF stated to the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 
Inquiry into Effective Decision Making for the Successful Delivery of Significant 
Infrastructure Projects that the 'HVHR process… is directed at ensuring the guidance 
and processes are thoroughly and consistently applied'. 
In introducing the HVHR process, DTF advised government that the priority was to: 
x enforce the requirement for a robust business case with clear project 
objectives, well-defined benefits, a rigorous appraisal of options, selection of 
appropriate procurement methods and appropriate governance and management 
x clearly articulate a tender proposal, appointment approach and contract 
management framework that appropriately allocates and manages risk, delivers 
benefits and effectively manages scope and cost. 
1.2 Victoria's approach to managing investments 
1.2.1 Guidance 
DTF's investment lifecycle framework guides agencies to derive maximum benefit from 
investments by helping them to:  
x conceptualise an investment by establishing the need and defining the benefits  
x prove a solution by assessing the costs, benefits and risks of likely options 
x procure the investment by awarding a contract that best delivers the solution 
and provides value for money 
x implement the solution to realise benefits and manage costs and risks 
x realise the benefits and measure the success of the investment.  
Figure 1A shows the guidelines, tools and templates DTF makes available so that 
agencies can effectively navigate this pathway. It also shows the role of the Gateway 
Review Process—or 'Gateway'. 
Background 
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  Figure 1A
Investment lifecycle and HVHR guidelines, tools and templates 
 
Source: Department of Treasury and Finance, Investment Lifecycle and High Value/High Risk 
Guidelines—Overview (2014). 
1.2.2 Review and oversight of government investments 
The mechanisms for reviewing the rigour and progress of investments from concept 
through to benefit realisation and informing government funding decisions are: 
x departmental, quality-assured documentation—justifying the investment and 
its procurement and implementation approaches 
x DTF review and advice to government—the value and complexity of each 
investment determining the depth and type of review applied 
x the Gateway Review Process—examining investments at key decision points 
and providing advice to the project's senior responsible person. 
Figure 1B shows what the review process looks like for a complex, risky or high value 
project where all these review layers are applied. The HVHR process involves 
strengthening DTF's review of investments up to and including implementation and the 
following Section defines the scope and content of HVHR reviews. 
Background 
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  Figure 1B
Investment review process 
 
Source: Department of Treasury and Finance, Investment Lifecycle and High Value/High Risk 
Guidelines—Overview (2014). 
1.3 Scope and content of the HVHR process 
1.3.1 Investments captured by HVHR 
The HVHR process applies to all general government sector infrastructure and 
information and communications technology investments that are likely to draw on 
Budget funding and: 
x have a total estimated investment greater than $100 million, or 
x are identified as high risk using an approved risk assessment tool, or 
x are determined by government as warranting the rigour of increased oversight. 
The general government sector includes approximately 200 agencies that directly 
provide public services such as departments, public hospitals and further education 
institutes.  
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While the process is primarily applied to Budget-funded investments, it can—at the 
government's discretion—be applied to investments by state-controlled corporations 
that sit outside the general government sector. These are the seven public financial 
corporations, e.g. the Treasury Corporation of Victoria, and around 80 public 
non-financial corporations, e.g. the Port of Melbourne, water corporations and Alpine 
Resorts. 
These reviews are discretionary because investments in these entities are usually not 
funded from the State Budget but made on a commercial basis from their own 
resources. 
DTF's public statements around this issue are not uniformly consistent and clear, with 
reference to the inclusion of all investments over $100 million 'regardless of the 
funding source' on its website. The audit examines this clarity issue in Part 2 of this 
report. 
1.3.2 Structure and content of the HVHR reviews 
The HVHR process builds on DTF's existing Investment Lifecycle Guidelines and 
Gateway reviews. HVHR investments are subject to extra scrutiny by DTF and 
additional Treasurer's approvals at the following stages—for the business case 
deliverability assessment, at critical milestones during procurement and for significant 
variations after contract sign off. 
Within the HVHR process, DTF also monitors critical recommendations arising from 
Gateway reviews on 'Concept and Feasibility' (Gate 1) to 'Tender Decision' (Gate 4). 
Preliminary business case 
DTF advises government on strategic merit and need and whether the proposal should 
be developed into a full business case. 
This review is clearly part of the HVHR assessment because DTF's guidance 
documentation indicates that only HVHR projects must submit a preliminary business 
case. Non-HVHR projects instead submit a less extensive strategic assessment.  
The key decision is whether a project should proceed to a full business case based on 
a preliminary assessment of strategic merit, an early options assessment and the 
project's likely costs, benefits and risks—including a high level cost-benefit analysis. 
Full business case 
DTF provides advice to inform the Treasurer’s decision on whether the case is 
sufficiently robust to be submitted to government for funding by advising whether it is 
confident that the project’s intended benefits can be delivered on time and within 
budget. The government's assessment—also informed by DTF and the Department of 
Premier and Cabinet—goes beyond deliverability to also review the policy merit, 
affordability, scale and alignment of the proposal. 
Background 
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DTF has a template for its analysts on the scope, approach and documentation of 
HVHR full business case reviews. This template was initially developed in 2011 and 
updated in late 2012. 
DTF's assessment focuses on providing government with assurance that projects are 
'deliverable'. Figure 1C outlines this definition. At this stage, DTF needs to establish 
whether a well thought through plan has been developed to deliver the project as 
outlined in the business case. 
  Figure 1C
Project deliverability definition 
An assessment of project deliverability is DTF’s judgement on whether the business cases 
can achieve the:  
x nominated benefits proposed in the business cases, on budget and on time 
x according to the specific scope of the business cases. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from the Department of Treasury and Finance. 
After it does this assessment, DTF can recommend to the Treasurer that the project: 
x proceed for funding consideration—i.e. DTF assesses the project as deliverable 
x proceed for funding consideration subject to further refinement of identified 
issues—i.e. DTF assesses the project as deliverable if the final business case 
submitted for funding is updated to address specific issues 
x not proceed—i.e. DTF assesses the project as unlikely to be deliverable. 
Figure 1D shows how DTF addresses deliverability by assessing the project as 
conveyed in the business case across seven key areas. Analysts should cover these 
areas when assessing business cases for HVHR projects, supporting responses with a 
clear rationale and sufficient evidence to justify their assessments.  
The final DTF recommendation about whether to proceed is based on a balanced 
assessment, taking account of the responses in each of these areas. 
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  Figure 1D
Business case assessment areas 
Deliver on budget—assess the comprehensiveness, logic and level of detail of the project 
costs, the incorporation of risks if alternative funding forms part of the business case and, 
where there are multiple options, whether these have been soundly costed. 
Deliver to time lines—assess whether project time lines and milestones are sound and 
supported by sufficient evidence and adequate plans to deliver as intended. Determine 
whether the time lines are consistent with those used for similar projects.  
Deliver benefits—assess whether the business case adequately demonstrates that the 
project can deliver the intended benefits, and compare the predicted benefits with those 
achieved by similar projects. 
Comprehensively manage risks—assess the comprehensiveness of the risk 
management plan included in the business case and determine whether there are any gaps 
and whether there is a clear strategy to mitigate material risks. 
Apply appropriate governance—assess whether the governance structure includes: 
x a clearly defined project owner 
x a board or steering committee with an appropriate mix of skills and experience 
x clear roles, responsibilities and decision-making processes 
x appropriate plans to secure the required resources and manage stakeholders. 
Adequately justify the preferred procurement approach—assess whether all suitable 
procurement options have been considered and whether the business case demonstrates 
that the proposed procurement strategy is the most effective and value-for-money way to 
deliver the project. 
Substantiate the project management approach—assess whether the business case 
clearly substantiates that: 
x the project is using an appropriate management strategy, is underpinned by sufficient 
project planning and has, or will develop, an appropriate change management plan and 
handover strategy from project team to end users 
x the organisation has, or can, secure the capability and skills required to deliver the 
project and has demonstrated that it can successfully deliver similar projects. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on Department of Treasury and Finance guidance. 
Procurement 
DTF provides advice to inform the Treasurer’s approval of: 
x procurement documentation prior to its release  
x the decision on the preferred bid prior to its announcement  
x the final contract, prior to signing. 
Reviews of tender documentation, the preferred bid decision and the final contract 
prior to sign-off are meant to ensure that: 
x the preferred procurement approach is effectively implemented and translated 
into a contractual framework that delivers on the best value-for-money approach 
x the risks of diminishing this outcome through unintended scope creep or a 
contractual form that diminishes the outcomes for the state are managed. 
Background 
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Post contract 
The HVHR process involves DTF monitoring project progress—including emerging 
issues and risks and any changes to the project scope and cost that was agreed to in 
the signed-off contractual arrangements—and advising the Treasurer about significant 
changes. The Treasurer approves significant contract variations based on advice from 
DTF. 
Within the HVHR process DTF also monitors projects post contract signing and during 
delivery through its quarterly reporting process to government and representation on 
project steering committees or equivalent. 
1.4 Reviews relevant to this audit 
1.4.1 VAGO audit—Gateway Review Process 
VAGO’s 2013 audit, Planning, Delivery and Benefits Realisation of Major Asset 
Investment: The Gateway Review Process, concluded that DTF had not systematically 
reviewed and verified the agency self-assessments of project risk that determine 
whether projects are subject to the Gateway reviews.  
DTF also uses these assessments to identify risky or complex projects under 
$100 million that should be covered by the HVHR process. 
Part of VAGO's recommendation on this issue required DTF to verify that all new 
projects had completed robust project risk assessments. 
1.4.2 Department of Treasury and Finance internal audit 
reviews of HVHR 
DTF commissioned two internal audit reviews of the HVHR process that reported in 
May 2012 and May 2014.  
Figures 1E and 1F summarise the findings from these internal audits, and Part 2 of this 
report examines whether DTF has acted on these findings. 
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  Figure 1E
Recommendations from HVHR May 2012 internal audit  
# Recommendation Rating / action Internal audit commentary 
1. Project business case 
assessment requirements 
should be structured and 
formalised. 
Moderate 
30 Sep 2012. 
x Lack of standards to guide the 
use of DTF’s business case 
assessment tool. 
x Variation across DTF analysts in 
detail required from agencies 
and evidence retained of 
approvals. 
2. Bring forward time frames for 
submission of preliminary/full 
business cases. 
Moderate 
30 Sep 2012. 
x Time lines for the provision and 
review of business cases during 
2011 and early 2012 for the 
2012–13 Budget cycle were 
difficult and not always met. 
3. A standard file structure 
should be implemented to 
assist HVHR process. 
Low 
30 Sep 2012. 
x DTF did not maintain 
documentation received from 
departments in a consistent or 
standardised way, impacting on 
the ability to obtain a clear audit 
trail of work undertaken. 
4. HVHR stakeholder 
engagement/communications 
activities should be 
enhanced. 
Low 
30 Sep 2012. 
x Communication issues around 
the transition to the then new 
HVHR process primarily around 
DTF’s information requirements. 
5. The relationship between 
HVHR and Gateway may 
require further clarity. 
Improvement 
opportunity  
No date set. 
x Some confusion for 
departmental project teams on 
the links and distinctions 
between the Gateway review 
and HVHR processes. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
The May 2014 audit was conducted as a separate exercise to the May 2012 audit and 
did not follow up on the earlier audit's recommendations. It is unclear why the later 
audit did not examine these earlier recommendations. 
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Figure 1F shows the recommendations, ratings and commentary of the later report. 
  Figure 1F
Recommendations from May 2014 HVHR internal audit 
# Recommendation Rating/action Internal audit commentary 
1. Outcomes from the 
lessons learnt 
database should be 
incorporated into 
the HVHR business 
case review 
process. 
 
Low 
30 November 2014. 
x A comprehensive Gateway lessons 
learnt database has been developed 
allowing for user access within DTF 
and by other key users, such as 
departments.  
x This database includes key lessons 
for projects based on independent 
gateway review recommendations, 
search capabilities and top 10 risks 
by project type. 
x This top 10 risk functionality is not 
currently used in HVHR deliverability 
assessments analysis so there is no 
formal linkage of these lessons learnt 
to current assessment processes to 
ensure that common project risks are 
adequately considered for HVHR 
projects. 
x There is the risk that available data is 
not effectively used to drive robust 
HVHR deliverability assessments.   
2. Impacts to project 
benefits realised 
should be tracked 
throughout the 
project lifecycle. 
Improvement 
opportunity  
30 November 2014. 
x There is no ongoing monitoring or 
reporting against project benefit 
metrics.  
x A template to track broader project 
benefits upon project completion 
against those proposed in the 
business case for all asset 
investments—i.e. HVHR and 
non-HVHR investments—has 
recently been made available to 
agencies. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
1.5 Audit objectives, scope and criteria 
This audit examined the effectiveness of the HVHR process in improving project 
business cases and procurements so that they provide an adequate basis for 
delivering intended project benefits within approved time lines and costs.  
It did this by assessing whether the HVHR process has: 
x been applied as intended to assess business cases, procurement approaches 
and contractual and governance arrangements for all relevant HVHR projects 
x resulted in improved business cases that provide a comprehensive and rigorous 
basis for government project decisions 
x resulted in improved procurements and ultimately improved delivery and 
outcomes. 
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1.5.1 Applying the HVHR process as intended 
Part 2 assesses whether DTF’s management and application of the HVHR process 
has been: 
x comprehensive—in terms of identifying HVHR projects and completing required 
reviews 
x consistently high quality—in terms of employing capable reviewers and 
applying a consistent, quality-assured approach to deliver high quality reviews 
x underpinned by adequate monitoring and reporting—firstly to government 
and also to agency stakeholders 
x evaluated in terms of its emerging impacts—by developing and applying a 
framework to measure improved timeliness, cost and benefit realisation. 
1.5.2 Impacts on business cases and procurements 
Part 3 examines HVHR reviews to determine their impacts on the quality of business 
cases and procurements and how this is likely to affect project outcomes. 
For a sample of business cases we assessed whether HVHR assessments of the 
deliverability of intended benefits according to planned costs and time lines were 
robust. We did this by examining whether they provided adequate assurance that 
projects would: 
x deliver on budget 
x deliver to planned time lines  
x deliver the intended benefits 
x comprehensively manage risks 
x apply appropriate governance 
x apply a procurement strategy that represented value for money 
x apply an appropriate and effective project management approach. 
We also examined whether the procurement reviews were undertaken as required and 
contributed to assurance that the procurement approach approved as part of the 
business case was effectively implemented.  
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1.6 Audit method and cost 
The audit team gathered evidence by examining the application of the HVHR process 
for five projects, namely: 
x Registration and licensing system—this project involves replacement of 
VicRoads registration and licensing IT systems and changes to supporting 
processes. The initial estimated cost was $173 million, with completion targeted 
for April 2013.  
x Mitcham Road and Rooks Road rail grade separations—this project is part of 
the Metro Level Crossing Blitz program and involves separating the rail from the 
road by lowering the rail tracks beneath Mitcham Road and Rooks Road, in 
Mitcham. The total estimated cost is $197 million and a target completion date of 
mid-2014. 
x Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital redevelopment—this project involves 
redeveloping the hospital at a cost of $165 million with a target completion date of 
December 2017. 
x Western Highway duplication from Beaufort to Buangor—this project is part 
of the $505 million Western Highway duplication project from Ballarat to Stawell, 
funded by the Commonwealth and state governments on an 80/20 basis. The 
project budget for the duplication from Beaufort to Buangor is around 
$140 million. It was contracted in April 2014 and construction is expected to 
commence in mid-2014.  
x Regional rolling stock—this investment involved the procurement of additional 
rolling stock for the regional rail network with total approved funding of 
$261 million and an expected final delivery date of August 2016. 
These projects were selected to give coverage of projects of different type, scale and 
complexity and from more than one sector that had been subject to substantial HVHR 
review and had also moved into implementation. 
 
V/Line VLocity train. 
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Towards the end of audit conduct we added three projects to our sample to test 
whether the introduction of an updated business case assessment template in 
late 2012 had improved the quality of reviews. 
The additional three projects were: 
x Blackburn Road grade separation 
x Kilmore Wallan bypass 
x Southland station. 
Audit evidence was gathered from DTF and the following departments and agencies 
responsible for planning and delivering the sample projects: 
x Department of Health 
x Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure 
x Public Transport Victoria 
x VicRoads. 
The audit was conducted in accordance with section 15 of the Audit Act 1994 and the 
Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards. 
Pursuant to section 20(3) of the Audit Act 1994, any persons named in this report are 
not the subject of adverse comment or opinion. 
The total cost of the audit was $370 000. 
1.7 Structure of the report 
The report is structured as follows: 
x Part 2 examines the management of the HVHR process 
x Part 3 examines the impact of the HVHR process. 
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2 Management of the High Value High Risk process 
At a glance 
Background  
Effectively managing the High Value High Risk (HVHR) process involves establishing a 
review capacity, applying clear policies and procedures to guide and record reviews, 
applying rigorous quality assurance, clearly communicating with stakeholders and 
monitoring and reporting on the process and its outcomes. 
Conclusion 
There is considerable scope for the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) to 
improve how the HVHR process is managed, making it more efficient, transparent and 
accountable. DTF has not yet adequately addressed the changes recommended by its 
May 2012 internal audit and VAGO's Gateway Review Process audit. 
Findings  
x DTF identifies HVHR Budget-funded projects over $100 million but does not 
systematically identify lower value high risk projects, or projects funded by public 
corporations outside the Budget sector. 
x HVHR reviews are documented and justified inconsistently because guidelines 
and templates are not comprehensive. Not applying a standardised file structure 
and comprehensive central register of HVHR activities diminishes efficiency. 
x Lessons from HVHR reviews are not effectively collated and communicated to 
agencies subject to the HVHR process. 
x DTF has not made enough progress in evaluating HVHR process outcomes. 
Recommendations 
That the Department of Treasury and Finance: 
x improves its approach to selecting projects for inclusion under HVHR 
x develops assessment guidance and templates covering all HVHR stages 
x improves the administration of the HVHR and how it communicates with and 
informs departments about HVHR 
x identifies potential conflicts of interests and documents how these are mitigated  
x develops and applies an evaluation tool to measure HVHR outcomes. 
Management of the High Value High Risk process 
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2.1 Introduction 
Effectively managing the High Value High Risk (HVHR) process involves establishing a 
review capacity, applying clear policies and procedures to guide and record reviews, 
applying rigorous quality assurance, clearly communicating with stakeholders and 
monitoring and reporting on the process and its outcomes. 
We assessed whether the Department of Treasury and Finance's (DTF) overall 
management and application of the HVHR process had been: 
x comprehensive—capturing all high value and risky projects within the HVHR 
process and completing all prescribed reviews (Section 2.3) 
x consistently high quality—employing capable reviewers, applying a consistent, 
quality-assured approach to deliver high quality reviews (Section 2.4) 
x underpinned by adequate monitoring and reporting—firstly to government 
and also to departments so they could understand the process and respond to 
the lessons learned across all reviews (Section 2.5) 
x evaluated in terms of emerging impacts—by applying a framework to measure 
improved timeliness, budgeting and benefit realisation (Section 2.6). 
We have also drawn on VAGO's May 2013 audit Planning, Delivery and Benefits 
Realisation of Major Asset Investment: The Gateway Review Process and on DTF's 
internal audit findings and recommendations reported in May 2012 and May 2014. 
2.2 Conclusion 
There is considerable scope for DTF to improve how the HVHR process is managed to 
make it more efficient, transparent and accountable. Its May 2012 internal audit and 
VAGO's audit of the Gateway Review Process (Gateway) recommended changes that 
DTF has not yet fully addressed.  
DTF effectively captures within the HVHR process projects valued over $100 million 
which rely on funding from the State Budget. However, the audit identified 
management weaknesses that DTF needs to respond to, including: 
x addressing VAGO's previous findings about gaps in DTF's approach to assessing 
whether projects valued between $5 million and $100 million should be in the 
HVHR process  
x providing criteria for assessing whether non-Budget funded projects typically 
funded by public corporations should be captured by the HVHR process 
x extending detailed guidance and templates provided to DTF analysts for business 
case assessments to cover the entire HVHR process 
x better administering the process by applying a standard documentation and 
record-keeping approach to all reviews and maintaining a master register which 
comprehensively documents review activities 
x improving the collation and communication of lessons learned and better 
practices observed across all HVHR reviews 
x applying an evaluation framework to reliably measure the outcomes of the HVHR 
process and understand further areas for improvement. 
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2.3 Comprehensively applying the HVHR process 
The HVHR process aims to capture Budget-funded infrastructure and information and 
communications technology (ICT) investments that are valued at more than 
$100 million or are assessed as high risk or that the government identifies as requiring 
more intensive review and oversight. 
The five projects we reviewed in detail had been subject to the required HVHR reviews 
and approvals, with one exception—the regional trains rolling stock project.  
For this project the most significant exception was the lack of evidence that the 
Treasurer approved the request for proposal document. However, DTF adequately 
justified this on the basis that the Treasurer had approved the procurement strategy for 
a single supplier to bid. There is no evidence that the absence of approval for the 
request for proposal document compromised the integrity of the procurement process. 
In terms of coverage, DTF has included Budget-funded projects over $100 million 
within the HVHR process since it was first used in the 2012–13 Budget cycle. 
However, it is not clear that the HVHR process has been applied to all intended 
projects, specifically for projects: 
x valued between $5 million and $100 million that are high risk, because DTF 
cannot show that it has reviewed risk profile reports when deciding on their 
HVHR status 
x over $100 million that are funded outside of the Budget by public corporations, 
because there is no systematic assessment process and inclusion is activated 
only through a specific request by government. 
The government announced funding commitments of up to $27 billion as part of the 
2014-15 Budget for infrastructure projects, with most ($24 billion) designated as HVHR 
projects that have not progressed through the HVHR process. These included projects 
funded under government's unsolicited bids policy and multi-billion dollar projects for a 
rail tunnel linking Southern Cross and South Yarra stations and stage 2 of the East 
West Link. 
It is currently unclear how the HVHR process will be applied to unsolicited bids and to 
major projects that have been fast tracked to a funding commitment without any HVHR 
reviews. 
The absence of a comprehensive central, up-to-date register to provide a consolidated 
record of risk assessments and subsequent reviews for HVHR projects makes it 
difficult for DTF to demonstrate that the HVHR process is comprehensively applied.  
This is an essential management tool and DTF should develop and maintain a 
comprehensive register. 
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2.3.1 Identifying HVHR projects 
This Section provides the evidence on our overall findings. 
Total estimated investment greater than $100 million 
DTF has effective processes in place to capture within the HVHR process projects 
worth more than $100 million that are funded through the State Budget. Most of these 
projects are for assets in the general government sector. This sector includes 
approximately 200 agencies directly providing public services such as departments, 
public hospitals and further education institutes. It excludes seven public financial 
corporations, such as the Treasury Corporation of Victoria and, around 80 public 
non-financial corporations, such as the Port of Melbourne Corporation, water 
corporations and Alpine Resorts. 
Public corporations outside of the general government sector typically rely on their own 
finances, not the State Budget, to fund major projects. The major exception is transport 
investments, which are normally funded through the State Budget but are held by a 
public corporation, VicTrack.  
DTF does not usually include in the HVHR process projects that are funded outside the 
State Budget unless requested to do so by government. There is also a lack of clarity 
about whether projects under the recently announced unsolicited bids policy will be 
subjected to HVHR review. 
We found that projects over $100 million listed in the State Budget since the 2011–12 
Budget cycle had been reviewed under the HVHR process, with the exception of: 
x projects started before the application of HVHR review 
x projects funded outside of the State Budget by, for example, water corporations 
x expenditure related to a program of projects rather than a single project. 
The Public Accounts and Estimates Committee's (PAEC) Report on the 2012–13 
Financial and Performance Outcomes of May 2014 identified 33 projects in the  
2012–13 Budget Papers valued at more than $100 million that were not designated as 
HVHR.  
DTF confirmed that it does not include non-Budget-funded projects in the HVHR 
process unless specifically requested to do so by government. It has advised that 
HVHR exists primarily to provide Budget-related assurance, and public corporations 
have a commercial-based oversight overlay to manage investment risks.  
However, we note that DTF did not advise PAEC of this. Instead, DTF advised that 
these projects were not included in the HVHR process because they had started 
before its application or because the expenditure related to a program of projects 
rather than a single project. 
DTF needs to provide greater clarity by defining the criteria it uses to decide when 
non-Budget-funded projects should be captured by the HVHR process.  
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DTF also needs to clarify whether proposals received under the government’s new 
unsolicited proposal process, such as the $2.5 billion Pakenham and Cranbourne rail 
line upgrade, will be captured by the HVHR process. The value of this bid and the 
absence of a competitive bidding process make the application of the HVHR process 
to projects like this essential. 
DTF advised that it will propose to government that the Unsolicited Proposal Guideline 
should be updated to provide clarity on the role of the HVHR process. 
Identifying high risk projects under $100 million 
In 2013, VAGO concluded that DTF had not systematically reviewed and verified 
agencies' self-assessments used to decide which projects fall within the Gateway 
Review Process. DTF uses these same assessments to decide whether to include 
projects in the HVHR process. 
Figure 2A summarises our 2013 findings and recommendations to DTF. In summary, 
VAGO recommended that DTF improve its processes for systematically documenting 
its reviews of agency risk assessments.  
DTF accepted the recommendation but indicated that it was already undertaking risk 
assessments of projects independent of the Gateway Project Profile Model risk 
assessment tool.  
However, 12 months later, DTF has not provided evidence to show that it now verifies 
the quality and comprehensiveness of risk assessments for projects under $100 million 
or undertakes its own risk assessments as part of the HVHR process.  
  Figure 2A
VAGO risk profiling recommendation and DTF's response 
VAGO’s 2013 audit on the Gateway Review Process (GRP) concluded that DTF: 
'has not systematically reviewed and verified agency self-assessments of project risk, 
which determine whether projects are subject to the GRP. In many cases, responsible 
departments and agencies have not undertaken the required GRP risk assessment'. 
VAGO recommended that DTF: 
'systematically validate whether projects should be subject to Gateway review, by 
verifying that robust project risk assessments are completed for new projects'. 
DTF's formal response to the recommendation stated that: 
'As part of the High Value High Risk (HVHR) framework, DTF already undertakes risk 
assessments of projects to determine which projects should be classified as HVHR and 
subject to the Gateway Review Process (GRP). This assessment takes into account risk 
assessments undertaken by departments (including Project Profile Models) as well as 
DTF’s own independent assessment of risk. DTF will examine further options to improve 
this process, including enhanced documentation outlining the reasons for DTF’s risk 
assessment of projects.' 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, Planning, Delivery and Benefits Realisation of Major 
Asset Investment: The Gateway Review Process, May 2013. 
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2.3.2 Application of HVHR process to significant projects 
announced in the 2014–15 State Budget 
The 2014-15 Budget commits up to $27 billion in new infrastructure including up to 
$21 billion on the following two projects: 
x $8.5 to $11 billion for the Melbourne Rail Link, which includes a tunnel linking 
Southern Cross and South Yarra stations and a new airport rail link 
x $8 to $10 billion to complete the East West Link by extending the eastern section 
from the Tullamarine Freeway to the Western Ring Road (stage 2). 
These projects are listed as HVHR projects in the Budget Papers but have not 
progressed through any steps in the HVHR review process normally undertaken for 
funded projects. This is not how the HVHR process is usually applied to projects over 
$100 million, which requires the Treasurer's approval to proceed to funding based on a 
deliverability assessment of the full business case.  
Government's funding decisions on the Melbourne Rail Link and East West Link 
stage 2 projects require the development of a full business case in line with the HVHR 
process. However, DTF has advised that it intends to apply a tailored HVHR 
assessment process to these projects to enable project risks to be considered while 
supporting accelerated time frames. This tailored HVHR process is yet to be defined. 
Given the significance and scale of these projects it is critical that DTF determine how 
it will effectively apply the HVHR process within these truncated timelines to ensure 
that the project costs, benefits and time lines have been robustly determined. 
2.3.3 Applying the HVHR process 
There are 11 steps in the HVHR review process covering project development, 
procurement and post-implementation variations and monitoring, as outlined in 
Figure 2B. None of these steps are optional. However, during the introduction of the 
HVHR process in 2011, where well advanced projects were brought into the process, 
the early stages of review were not retrospectively applied.  
This audit examined application of the HVHR process to five projects, namely: 
x the registration and licensing system (RandL) 
x Mitcham Road and Rooks Road Rail grade separations 
x Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital redevelopment 
x Western Highway duplication from Beaufort to Buangor 
x regional rolling stock procurement. 
Figure 2B maps the 11 major HVHR steps against each of the five projects we 
selected for detailed review.  
This shows that mandated HVHR reviews have been completed, except for RandL and 
regional trains. This is because the HVHR process was introduced in mid-2011, after 
RandL had already passed through these stages. DTF did not provide evidence that 
the regional trains contract review or procurement document approval steps were 
undertaken. 
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The lack of a comprehensive master register showing all HVHR review activities and a 
structured and consistent approach to record-keeping made it difficult to extend our 
process analysis beyond this small sample of projects.  
Applying these improvements will provide greater assurance that DTF completes 
required HVHR reviews.  
  Figure 2B
Completion of mandatory HVHR review and approval steps 
# HVHR Step  RandL Mitcham Eye & Ear RRS W. Hwy 
1. Review preliminary business case N/A 9 9 9 9 
2. Review full business case N/A 9 9 9 9 
3. Approval of full business case N/A 9 9 9 9 
4. Review procurement documents N/A 9 9 9 9 
5. Approval procurement documents N/A 9 9 X 9 
6. Review preferred tender N/A 9 9 9 9 
7. Approval of preferred tender/bid N/A 9 9 9 9 
8. Review of contract N/A 9 9 X 9 
9. Approval of contract N/A 9 9 9 9 
10. Review of project performance  9 9 9 9 9 
11. Approval of major variations 9 N/A N/A 9 N/A 
Note: 'Mitcham' refers to the Mitcham Road rail grade separation, 'Eye & Ear' refers to the Eye 
and Ear Hospital redevelopment, 'RRS' refers to the regional rolling stock procurement project, 
and 'W Hwy' refers to the Western Highway duplication project. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
2.4 Supporting consistently high-quality reviews  
We assessed whether DTF had deployed the processes and resources needed to 
support consistent, high-quality reviews providing: 
x sufficient and well-trained analysts and supervisory staff 
x clear guidance about assessment criteria and documenting reviews 
x quality assured reviews that are consistent, transparent and free from role conflict 
and conflict of interest. 
2.4.1 Capacity—analysts and supervisory staff 
The HVHR process is managed within DTF's Infrastructure Advice and Delivery group. 
DTF recruited 11 analysts during 2011 to enhance its capacity to complete HVHR 
reviews. These new staff complemented existing resources and represented a 
significant increase in DTF’s capacity to conduct reviews.  
DTF committed to develop and train its analysts to improve the consistency and depth 
of reviews. There is evidence that analysts are provided with a range of relevant 
training opportunities. However, DTF is yet to develop and implement structured 
development and training activities for HVHR analysts.  
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We acknowledge the critical role of on-the-job coaching, mentoring and feedback 
about performance. However, a structured program is also needed to provide a 
consistent level of base training, together with tailored, technical training to address 
needs and gaps identified through regular assessments of HVHR reviews.  
We have not seen evidence of DTF taking a structured approach to reviewing 
emerging needs and dealing with them using a range of mechanisms, such as a formal 
training program. 
2.4.2 Guiding and documenting HVHR assessments 
Developing a comprehensive set of review templates 
DTF has developed comprehensive guidance for agencies to develop, procure and 
implement capital projects in the form of the Investment Lifecycle and High Value/High 
Risk Guidelines. This material has been progressively expanded and improved.  
Achieving consistent, rigorous reviews across multiple HVHR projects using different 
reviewers represents a significant challenge. DTF recognises that review guidelines 
and templates should cover every stage of the HVHR process.  
However, only the business case review process currently has a template that provides 
detailed questions addressing the review objectives and requires analysts to 
consistently document the results of each review. There is room to improve the current 
business case template to better align it with the requirements of the Investment 
Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines that fall within the scope of the HVHR 
business case review. 
DTF also needs to extend the templates to other stages, including preliminary 
business case review and procurement.  
Better documenting and managing HVHR review records 
The May 2012 internal audit of HVHR found that 'DTF did not maintain documentation 
received from departments in a consistent or standardised way, impacting on the ability 
to obtain a clear audit trail of work undertaken'. It recommended that, 'A standard file 
structure should be implemented to assist the HVHR process'. 
Standardising documents and files would provide a clear audit trail and make the 
HVHR process more efficient by making it easier for different analysts to understand 
past review stages when doing the next review stage.  
DTF committed that by September 2012 it would develop 'a standardised file structure 
and assessment documentation to be used for all HVHR projects'.  
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DTF designed a file structure for this purpose in late 2012, but it has not been 
consistently applied. The project files we reviewed were not standardised or easily 
navigable, with significant differences in the type and detail of documentation retained.  
This made it more difficult to assess reviews and led to follow-up requests during the 
audit because information was not on file. DTF should apply a standard file structure 
and assessment documentation for all stages of the HVHR process. 
2.4.3 Quality assurance 
When introducing HVHR, DTF committed to applying the process consistently and 
impartially. This is important, given the significant role of the HVHR process in 
providing government with assurance about the robustness of project planning and 
delivery. 
We have seen evidence that senior DTF staff review all HVHR review briefings. 
However, these quality reviews are not in a standard form and do not clearly conclude 
whether HVHR reviews have adequately addressed the key criteria for assessing 
material submitted by departments.  
For example, with a business case, the quality review should confirm or clarify the 
HVHR assessment conclusions about whether the analysis and evidence supporting 
the project's time lines, budget and expected benefits adheres to the Investment 
Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines. 
At present, the only consistently documented evidence of review is the signature of the 
reviewer on the relevant brief. This does not provide assurance on the scope and 
adequacy of the review and is exacerbated by the fact that templates are not in place 
for HVHR reviews, except for the business case assessment.  
A review based on a comprehensive template would provide greater quality assurance 
and clearly indicate what evidence had been relied on to support the assessment and 
recommended action.  
2.4.4 Understanding and managing perceived conflicts 
Concerns about role conflict and confusion created by DTF representatives sitting on 
steering committees or project boards and also advising government about a project's 
performance have been previously raised by VAGO, the Ombudsman and PAEC. 
Figure 2C summarises the concerns reported by the Ombudsman and PAEC.  
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  Figure 2C
Previous Ombudsman and PAEC findings 
Victorian Ombudsman 
The November 2011 report Own motion investigation into ICT-enabled projects found a lack 
of clarity about the role of DTF representatives on project steering committees and 
recommended that the terms of reference for steering committees include details of the role 
to be played by each person on a committee. 
Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 
The December 2012 report Inquiry into Effective Decision Making for the Successful 
Delivery of Major Infrastructure Projects included a finding that concerns had been raised 
by VAGO about role confusion for DTF, which is responsible for both assisting with project 
proposals and assessing those proposals on behalf of government. The committee 
proposed a revised approach that involved DTF focusing solely on providing assurance to 
the investor. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, based on Ombudsman and Public Accounts and 
Estimates Committee reports. 
Quality reviews should verify the independence of advice by disclosing and addressing 
any actual or perceived conflicts of interest. We found evidence of DTF staff, and in 
some cases the same review analyst, having contributed to the submission 
development by sitting on a project steering committee. This was the case for three of 
the five HVHR projects examined during the audit. 
DTF agreed that there could be a perception of conflict of interest as a result of fulfilling 
multiple roles but asserted that there is no actual conflict. It further advised that any 
perceived or potential conflicts are effectively managed as a result of the following 
review layers: 
x HVHR analyst advice is subject to review by their manager, director and the 
Deputy Secretary and Secretary of DTF  
x the Deputy Secretary Budget reviews DTF advice to the Budget and Expenditure 
Review Committee (BERC) of Cabinet on Budget issues but has no role in the 
HVHR process 
x DTF's HVHR committee reviews DTF's role in the HVHR process. 
These practices do not change VAGO's position that potential conflicts should be 
documented, together with DTF's approach to managing them, so that those receiving 
advice are aware of them and of how they are being managed. 
2.5 Monitoring and reporting 
2.5.1 Communicating with government 
DTF committed to more proactive monitoring of investment delivery under the HVHR 
process when it advised government on its introduction.  
DTF's quarterly reports to BERC on HVHR projects and its regular DTF HVHR 
accountability report are effective in informing DTF senior staff and government on 
project progress in terms of outputs, time lines and budgets, and about project risks. 
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However, these reports do not routinely address the achievement of intended project 
benefits, and projects are typically removed from these reports once implemented. 
In addition, these reports have not comprehensively covered all HVHR projects from 
when they were designated as being subject to the review process. Our analysis 
shows a lag of over three months for some projects between the time they were 
designated as HVHR and when they were first included in major project monitoring 
reports to government and DTF. 
The May 2014 internal audit identified the need for more robust monitoring of, and 
reporting on, progress against proposed benefits—financial and non-financial—
throughout the project lifecycle.  
DTF recently developed and released to agencies a template to track broader project 
benefits against those proposed in the business case for all asset investments—i.e. 
HVHR and non-HVHR investments. 
2.5.2 Sharing lessons and better practice with agencies 
Periodically reporting on progress and emerging lessons, as well as understanding 
agencies’ views on the benefits and drawbacks from reviews, is critical to realising the 
potential of the HVHR process.  
DTF previously committed to sharing and applying lessons learned and to completing 
an annual satisfaction survey across participating agencies.  
DTF has not fully met these commitments and needs to act on these overdue actions. 
The evidence shows that: 
x DTF manages HVHR reviews on a project-by-project basis and has not 
systematically communicated key lessons across the sector  
x the May 2012 internal audit also recommended that DTF enhance stakeholder 
communication and engagement. While engaging constructively and intensively 
around individual project reviews, DTF does not have a structured approach to 
understanding and learning from agencies’ combined experiences of the HVHR 
process because it does not formally survey them.  
Notwithstanding this, DTF provided evidence of actions taken to share some lessons 
with agencies through presentations and ongoing informal communication. DTF has 
also progressively updated and enhanced the Investment Lifecycle and High Value 
High Risk Guidelines material and shared feedback on the quality of HVHR business 
cases with the Victorian Infrastructure Policy Reference Group. This group includes 
representatives from government departments. 
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We sought feedback from agencies on their experience of, and perspectives on, the 
HVHR process. This feedback was largely positive but agencies were consistent in 
their desire to see DTF communicate any common lessons or issues identified from 
distilling the results of HVHR reviews undertaken to date. Other commonly raised 
issues and comments included: 
x a lack of clarity about the timing and scope of application of the HVHR process 
during its initial introduction 
x a gradual improvement in clarity about information requirements for reviews 
x time pressures in preparing business cases and adequately addressing issues 
raised by HVHR reviews 
x some projects costing over $100 million are not necessarily complex or high risk 
because they have common characteristics and are routinely delivered 
successfully by agencies and so do not necessarily warrant additional scrutiny 
under the HVHR process. 
2.6 Evaluating the impacts of the HVHR process 
Like any government-funded program, the most important thing to understand is how 
well the investment has achieved intended objectives—i.e. making projects more 
predictable in terms of delivering on time and within budget and realising the benefits 
that underpin business cases. 
DTF committed to undertaking an independent evaluation of the HVHR process and 
reporting the results to government by June 2014. This review has not been 
commissioned, and we have seen no evidence of progress towards this. DTF has not 
developed an evaluation framework, nor collected and processed the data needed to 
measure the outcomes attributable to the HVHR process.  
This is a significant gap that DTF needs to address.  
VAGO’s recent audit on the Gateway Review Process found that in 2004 the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet developed a detailed review tool to be used over 
time to assess the impact of the Gateway process against its underlying objectives, 
outlined when the process was introduced. This tool was developed in consultation 
with DTF and departments. The Gateway Supervisory Committee and the government 
endorsed the review tool in August 2004. 
The review tool provides a sound basis for ongoing review of the impact of the 
Gateway Review Process. Despite this, and the government's endorsement, DTF 
informed us that it has not implemented this tool to evaluate Gateway, nor adapted the 
tool to evaluate the impact of the HVHR process. 
This tool was developed for the Gateway Review Process and would be a good 
starting point for DTF to measure the impact of the HVHR process. 
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Recommendations 
That the Department of Treasury and Finance: 
1. improves its approach to selecting projects for inclusion in the High Value High 
Risk process by: 
x systematically reviewing projects between $5 million and $100 million to 
determine whether they should be subject to the High Value High Risk 
process through documented reviews of project risk assessments 
x clarifying the criteria for selecting public projects that do not require Budget 
funding for inclusion in the High Value High Risk process 
x recommending that projects over $100 million selected under the 
government's unsolicited bids policy be subject to High Value High Risk 
processes 
2. develops assessment guidance and templates covering all High Value High Risk 
stages to improve the consistency, rigour and transparency of High Value High 
Risk reviews 
3. improves its administration of the High Value High Risk process by: 
x applying a standardised file structure for managing assessment documents 
and supporting evidence 
x developing and maintaining a comprehensive central register of High Value 
High Risk review activity by project and High Value High Risk process stage 
4. improves how it communicates with and informs departments by: 
x developing a structured approach to collating and sharing the lessons from 
all High Value High Risk reviews 
x completing an annual satisfaction survey of agencies that have been subject 
to High Value High Risk reviews 
5. identifies potential conflicts of interests of reviewers and documents how these 
are mitigated  
6. develops and applies an evaluation tool to measure the extent to which the High 
Value High Risk process is affecting project outcomes. 
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3 Impact of the High Value High Risk process 
At a glance 
Background  
The High Value High Risk (HVHR) process was introduced to provide more certainty 
that expected outcomes and benefits for projects would be delivered. This would occur 
by strengthening the Department of Treasury and Finance's (DTF) support for and 
scrutiny of projects classified as HVHR. 
Conclusion 
DTF has improved the scrutiny and quality of business cases and procurements 
captured by the HVHR process. However, these improvements have not lifted 
practices so they consistently and comprehensively meet DTF's better practice 
guidelines. There are gaps and inconsistencies which DTF needs to address if it is to 
realise the potential benefits of the process. 
Findings  
x There is clear evidence that HVHR reviews have stimulated agencies to address 
significant business case and procurement issues. 
x However, some business case submissions do not fully meet DTF's better 
practice guidelines. The observed weaknesses relate to reliable estimation of 
benefits, justifying a preferred procurement strategy and governance and project 
management arrangements. 
x The problems with the RandL registration and licensing system project flag 
important lessons about getting appropriately skilled and experienced people in 
key project and board positions. 
Recommendations 
That the Department of Treasury and Finance: 
x provides greater assurance that HVHR reviews comprehensively test compliance 
with its Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines in areas critical 
for project deliverability 
x checks that for complex, risky projects—particularly those involving ICT 
transformations—the specialist skills needed to successfully manage, oversee 
and quality assure these projects have been assessed and acquired. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This Part examines the impacts of High Value High Risk (HVHR) reviews on the quality 
of business cases and procurements for the following five projects: 
x registration and licensing system (RandL) 
x Mitcham Road and Rooks Road rail grade separations (Mitcham Road) 
x Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital redevelopment (Eye and Ear Hospital ) 
x Western Highway duplication from Beaufort to Buangor (Western Highway) 
x regional rolling stock procurement (regional trains). 
Towards the end of the audit we examined a further three projects to assess the impact 
of the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) updating its business case 
assessment template in late 2012. 
 
Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital. 
Section 3.3 examines whether HVHR assessments of business case deliverability 
were robust. Section 3.4 examines the procurement reviews and Treasurer's approval 
of tender documents, preferred bid decisions and the final contracts. Both use the 
relevant parts of DTF's Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines as 
the basis for these assessments. 
Section 3.5 summarises our findings for the RandL project, which is the one project 
that most clearly failed the deliverability test. We also use this section to explain why 
this happened and the lessons to be drawn from this. 
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3.2 Conclusion  
DTF has improved the scrutiny and quality of business cases and procurements 
captured by the HVHR process. However, these improvements have not lifted 
practices so they consistently and comprehensively meet DTF's better practice 
guidelines. There are gaps and inconsistencies which DTF needs to address if it is to 
fully realise the potential benefits of the process. 
HVHR business case reviews raised substantive issues and agencies modified 
submissions to address these issues. However, these positive findings were not 
consistently reflected across all projects nor for all the criteria that DTF uses to test 
projects' deliverability. 
DTF's level of scrutiny and assurance needs to improve across all the 'deliverability' 
criteria. Its performance was best for assuring project costs, time lines and agencies' 
approaches to risk management, more mixed for procurement, governance and project 
management and clearly inadequate for assuring the expected project benefits.  
None of the business cases adequately justified projects' benefits and this makes the 
absence of any substantive HVHR review of the area a cause for concern. 
RandL was not fully captured by the HVHR process because its procurement 
happened well before the process started. However, the updated late-2011 business 
case was subject to a HVHR type review, and the project was included in the process 
from late 2011. 
The management and oversight applied to the RandL project was not effective in 
detecting and controlling risks before they materialised to significantly delay the project 
and increase the estimated cost of delivery. The single most critical cause of this was 
the absence of sufficiently skilled resources. 
3.3 Business case reviews 
We tested the quality of the assurance provided by HVHR reviews against the criteria 
in the HVHR Business Case Deliverability Assessment Guidance document, which 
replaced an earlier, less detailed guide that used the same criteria.  
We applied the Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines criteria to 
assess the quality of assurance. Our assessment is based on the documentation 
provided by DTF. 
Figure 3A describes our assessment of HVHR reviews of the business cases of the 
different projects against six criteria that include a combined assessment of 
governance and project management  
DTF applied the greatest amount of scrutiny and achieved the highest level of 
assurance in the areas of project budgets, time lines and risk management. 
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In contrast, the level of assurance in relation to project benefits, preferred procurement 
approach and governance and management was lower. In particular, DTF applied little 
scrutiny to, and asked few questions about, the reliability of project benefits, even 
though business cases did not contain sufficient information to verify the scope and 
quantum of these benefits. 
There is considerable room for DTF to improve its performance in this area. Some 
improvements do not require much change—for example, making sure that business 
cases are updated where additional significant information is provided. However, other 
improvements, such as adequately testing the reliability of project benefits, requires a 
major change in approach and acquisition of skills needed to do this.  
  Figure 3A
VAGO assessment of assurance against  
HVHR requirements for project business cases 
Deliverability criteria Mitcham Eye&Ear RRS W Hwy RandL 
Deliver on budget—assurance about costs 9 ? 9 9 ? 
Deliver to planned time lines 999 999 ? 9 ? 
Deliver intended benefits: ? ? ? ? ? 
Comprehensively manage risks 9 ? 9 9 ? 
Governance and project management ? ? ? 9 ? 
Procure for best value for money 9 999 ? 9 NA 
Note:  
999 = Fully assured—There was an updated, reviewed business case which fully addressed the 
Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines and provided a high level of assurance. 
9= Improving assurance—There was evidence that HVHR reviews improved the level of 
assurance while not fully addressing all issues. The significance of these outstanding issues varies 
from relatively minor, e.g. where business cases were not updated with additional evidence, to more 
significant, e.g. where DTF has not raised or the agency has not addressed material issues. We 
provide a commentary on these issues below. 
? = Not assured—There was insufficient evidence to be assured about the deliverability of the 
project. 
NA = Not applicable. 
Note: 'Mitcham' refers to the Mitcham Road rail grade separation, 'Eye&Ear' refers to the Eye and 
Ear Hospital redevelopment, 'RRS' refers to the regional rolling stock procurement project, and 
'W Hwy' refers to the Western Highway duplication project. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
3.3.1 Deliver on budget—assurance about costs 
At this HVHR stage departments need to provide a bottom-up, detailed cost estimate, 
including appropriate and evidence-based allowances for contingencies and risks. We 
found that DTF applied significant effort in testing cost estimates by questioning their 
basis and working with departments to address their questions. 
Figure 3B shows we rated the RandL and Eye and Ear Hospital projects as 'Not 
assured' because of significant, unaddressed cost uncertainties. For the remaining 
projects, we found that DTF's review had clearly improved assurance.  
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  Figure 3B
Findings on costing the recommended solution 
Project Assessment Reasons 
Mitcham 
Road 
Improving 
assurance 
x DTF gained greater confidence about the estimated cost of the 
preferred option by obtaining additional information on the 
method applied, external review results, cost benchmarking and 
sensitivity analysis and the rationale for risk and contingency 
allowances.  
x DTF concluded that the recommended solution could be 
delivered at this cost. 
x VicRoads did not update the commentary in the business case 
to include this essential, additional evidence but it was included 
as an addendum. 
Eye and 
Ear 
Hospital 
Not assured x DTF was not satisfied that the recommended solution could be 
delivered for the initially estimated cost because the underlying 
assumptions were unrealistic.  
x The estimates appeared to be at a preliminary stage, applying 
generic costs to estimated floor areas, and the size of the 
contingency appeared low for this type of project. 
x DTF endorsed the updated business case cost, which was 
unchanged from the government's publicly announced cost, but 
with a higher contingency. 
x While this estimate included updated costings based on more 
detailed planning and design for early works, critical 
infrastructure and decanting, the cost estimates for the vast 
majority of the building works had not gone beyond the 
'preliminary stage'—estimates DTF deemed inadequate. The 
updated business case did not address all material issues. 
Regional 
trains 
Improving 
assurance 
x DTF identified that the business case contained insufficient detail 
on the project costs.  
x Public Transport Victoria provided additional information on the 
purchase and operating costs and included some of this 
information as an addendum to the business case. 
x DTF concluded that the costs, including risk allowances, were 
robust but there was still insufficient information in the business 
case. 
x We note that immediately before contractual close the 
government increased the number of trains purchased because 
the per unit price was less than expected and it decided to buy 
more trains within the budget allocated. 
Western 
Highway 
Improving 
assurance 
x DTF questioned the adequacy of the cost information in the 
business case and VicRoads addressed issues about the 
costing method, risks provisions, external review and 
benchmarking, sensitivity analysis and the basis for 
contingencies. 
x The updated business case included additional information, but 
we are not convinced it adequately addressed all of DTF's 
material questions. 
x In addition the costs were revised downwards by $67 million 
after submission of the business case because of a scope 
reduction but VicRoads adequately explained this. 
RandL Not assured See commentary under Section 3.5. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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3.3.2 Deliver to planned time lines  
The Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines require the business 
case to include a detailed and realistic project implementation schedule which 
encompasses key milestones, decision points and delivery events. 
Figure 3C shows that we assessed the reviews as fully assuring the time lines for 
Mitcham Road and the Eye and Ear Hospital, improving assurance for Western 
Highway but not assuring the time lines for the remaining two projects. 
  Figure 3C
Findings on business case information on project time lines 
Project Assessment Reasons 
Mitcham 
Road 
Fully assured x The business case included high level information on key 
milestones, with a full project construction program in an 
appendix. 
x The construction program was for a completion date one year 
earlier than the summary presented in the body of the business 
case. DTF assessed the time lines as reasonable because the 
information on critical paths and the estimated duration of tasks 
were transferable to a new completion date. 
Eye and 
Ear 
Hospital 
Fully assured x The business case included adequate information on the project 
implementation schedule, including key milestones, decision 
points and delivery events supported by a master program 
showing detailed activities and time lines for the project. 
Regional 
trains 
Not assured x DTF accepted the time lines as reasonable because the 
business case included an indicative time line for major project 
deliverables and information on the timing of other planned 
major changes that would impact on regional rolling stock. 
x However, this was not supported by a detailed program showing 
activities and time lines for the project, and we do not 
understand the basis for DTF's acceptance.  
Western 
Highway 
Improving 
assurance 
x DTF accepted the time lines as reasonable because the 
business case included a time line showing key tasks and 
milestone dates for the project. 
x The business case did not include a more detailed program. A 
key risk to the time lines was the Environmental Effects 
Statement process and the business case should have included 
a detailed program incorporating the management of this risk. 
x However, DTF sought and obtained additional information from 
VicRoads to support its conclusion that the time lines were 
reasonable and this information was included in the final 
business case.  
RandL Not assured x See commentary under Section 3.5. 
x The business case information on project time lines and 
implementation phasing was out of date, as it was based on a 
phased approach to implementation which did not reflect the fact 
that by mid-2011 VicRoads was pursuing a single-phase 
implementation. 
x Prior to the project being paused in early 2014, the 
implementation approach had been reversed to a multi-phase 
deployment because of the risks associated with single-phase 
implementation. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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3.3.3 Deliver the intended benefits 
Delivering service outcomes to benefit the community is the key reason for spending 
public money on infrastructure projects. Managing projects to secure, safeguard, 
maximise and realise the benefits is therefore essential. This requires an 
evidence-based understanding of the expected benefits and any risks to them being 
realised. 
It is worrying that such little review effort has been focused on confirming and securing 
project benefits. None of the business cases we reviewed included sufficient 
information to understand either the benefits or risks to their realisation. HVHR reviews 
have focused little or no effort on examining project benefits but instead focus on 
costs, time lines and cost-related risks. Figure 3D describes the results.  
  Figure 3D
Findings on business case coverage of benefit definition and delivery 
Project Assessment Reasons 
Mitcham 
Road 
Not assured x The business case did not adequately explain the basis for defining 
the problems being addressed and estimating the benefits of the 
recommended solution. 
x There was no evidence that DTF asked any questions about the 
project benefits, despite the lack of detail on these calculations. The 
attribution of wider economic benefits to the project without any 
reference to national and international guidelines on the appropriate 
use of these techniques went unchallenged. 
Eye and 
Ear 
Hospital 
Not assured x The business case did not adequately quantify the problems that the 
redevelopment was supposed to address, including inefficient 
scheduling and resource utilisation, safety and performance risks 
from ageing infrastructure, and the capacity to meet future demand. 
x None of these problems were adequately quantified and 
demonstrated to serve as the basis for measuring the benefits of 
improvement options. 
x Consequently, the benefits of the development are anecdotal, being 
based on statements about why the hospital needs to be 
redeveloped. 
x The inability to quantify the problems being addressed and the 
benefits in the business case should have been raised by DTF.  
Regional 
trains 
Not assured x The project's expected benefits are presented with no supporting 
information on the evidential basis for and source of these benefits. 
x The business case indicates that it is probable that the full benefits 
would not be achieved without an additional investment in high-
capacity Geelong line trains. 
x We found no scrutiny of these benefits by DTF during the HVHR 
review. 
Western 
Highway 
Not assured x The business case provided no information on the benefits of this 
section of the upgrade. Instead it referred to the cost-benefit 
analysis for the whole route, showing a benefit-cost ratio that was 
significantly less than one and provided no economic justification for 
this project. 
RandL Not assured x See commentary under Section 3.5. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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3.3.4 Comprehensively manage risks 
DTF's Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines require the business 
case to: 
x clearly identify and assess key risks associated with the proposed investment 
x describe the proposed approach to ongoing risk monitoring and management 
x document a risk management strategy. 
Figure 3E shows that RandL and the Eye and Ear Hospital did not meet the 
requirements, while HVHR reviews improved assurance for the remaining three 
projects, although outstanding unaddressed issues prevent us giving these a 'Fully 
assured' rating.  
  Figure 3E
Findings on business case coverage of risk 
Project Assessment Reasons 
Mitcham 
Road 
Improving 
assurance 
x The business case identified key project risks, explained how they were 
identified and included a combined risk register and risk management plan. 
x However, it did not include a description of the proposed approach and 
arrangements for ongoing risk monitoring and management, and DTF did not 
raise this during the review.  
Eye and 
Ear 
Hospital 
Not assured x The business case included a brief description of the proposed approach and 
arrangements for ongoing risk monitoring and management, identified key 
project risks, explained how they were assessed and included a combined risk 
register and management plan.  
x DTF raised the lack of a comprehensive risk register in the business case, but 
the department did not address this in the final version of the business case. 
x This is a concern, given the risks around refurbishing and rebuilding a hospital 
while still operating from the facility and a relatively small sum allocated to 
contingency. 
Regional 
trains 
Improving 
assurance 
x The business case included an appropriately detailed description of the 
proposed approach and arrangements for ongoing risk monitoring and 
management, identified key project risks, explained how they were identified 
and included a combined risk register and management plan.  
x However, the key commercial and legal risk identified in the body of the 
business case related to an external approval process for the proposed single 
source procurement approach that was not applicable to the project and so 
was irrelevant.  
x Also, the risk management section did not highlight the risk to benefit 
realisation of not securing additional investment in high-capacity Geelong line 
trains.  
Western 
Highway 
Improving 
assurance 
x The business case identified key project risks, explained how they were 
identified and included a risk register.  
x However, it did not adequately describe the proposed approach and 
arrangements for ongoing risk monitoring and management. 
RandL Not assured x See commentary under Section 3.5. 
x Business case included material on risk analysis and management, 
implementation risks and an appendix on risk.  
x However, it did not include a risk register, and the material that was included 
was largely focused on determining the required level of contingency for the 
project. Subsequent events show the risks were underestimated and not well 
managed. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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3.3.5 Apply appropriate governance and management 
DTF's Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines require the business 
case to demonstrate sound governance and project management arrangements.  
Figure 3F shows that none of the sample business cases we examined included 
sufficient explanation and evidence to fully assure the proposed governance and 
management arrangements. While some HVHR reviews identified this issue, the 
weaknesses were not addressed. For the Western Highway we found that the review 
had improved assurance about these arrangements. 
  Figure 3F
Findings on business case coverage of project governance and management 
Project Assessment Reasons 
Mitcham 
Road 
Not assured x The governance material in the business case was not sufficient to 
demonstrate the soundness of the proposed arrangements.  
x It was high level, did not include decision-making processes and did not 
provide sufficient detail on how governance would operate under the 
alliance delivery model. 
Eye and 
Ear 
Hospital 
Not assured x The governance material in the business case was not sufficient to 
demonstrate the soundness of the proposed arrangements.  
x DTF's HVHR assessment of the December 2011 business case identified 
a range of weaknesses but these were not addressed.  
x DTF's assessment of the updated August 2012 business case concluded 
that the governance arrangements were appropriate or standard for a 
capital project of this type, even though the text in these sections 
remained unchanged from the initial business case. 
Regional 
trains 
Not assured x The governance material in the business case was not sufficient to 
demonstrate the soundness of the proposed arrangements. It was high 
level, and did not include decision-making processes. 
Western 
Highway 
Improving 
assurance 
x The business case did not sufficiently demonstrate the soundness of the 
proposed governance arrangements. It was high level, consisting of three 
paragraphs in the body of the business case, did not include a chart 
explaining decision-making processes and so did not provide sufficient 
detail on how governance would operate.  
x DTF's HVHR assessment of the business case concluded that the 
governance structure identified was appropriate for the investment, but 
could be augmented to include DTF.  
x As part of the HVHR review, DTF obtained additional information from 
VicRoads to demonstrate the project management arrangements in place 
to secure required resources, including the required mix of skills, a change 
management strategy and a plan to move from delivery to asset operation. 
x In summary, we are assured about project management but not project 
governance. 
RandL Not assured x The governance material in the business case was not sufficient to 
demonstrate the soundness of the proposed arrangements. A high level 
governance structure was included, but there was no real detail on roles, 
responsibilities and decision-making processes.  
x A DTF-led review of the business case in mid-2011 found that it outlined 
the high level program governance only and would have benefited from 
more detail as to how lower level governance was intended to work. This 
review recommended that Victoria Police and Department of Justice 
representatives be added to the program board. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
Impact of the High Value High Risk process 
38       Impact of Increased Scrutiny of High Value High Risk Projects Victorian Auditor-General's Report 
3.3.6 Best value-for-money procurement 
The Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines require a range of 
procurement options to be considered and analysed. This analysis should be sufficient 
to demonstrate the basis for selecting the recommended procurement approach. 
Figure 3G sets out our findings on the extent to which the five sample business cases 
met these requirements.  
Only one of the business cases was assessed as meeting the requirements. Three 
business cases did not fully meet the requirements, primarily because they lacked 
supporting information or analysis to justify the assessments of different procurement 
approaches against the evaluation criteria.  
  Figure 3G
Findings on business case analysis of procurement approaches 
Project Assessment Reasons 
Mitcham 
Road 
Improving 
assurance 
x The business case did not adequately demonstrate that the 
recommended alliance contracting approach represented the 
best value-for-money procurement option.  
x The business case included a single table with tick box 
assessments for three options across multiple criteria. It did 
not demonstrate how the preferred alliance approach met the 
requirements of the national alliancing guidelines. 
x DTF's HVHR assessment identified this weakness and 
obtained further explanations and evidence from VicRoads. 
This material was added to the final business case. 
Eye and 
Ear 
Hospital 
Fully assured x The business case included a comprehensive and 
adequately supported analysis and evaluation of available 
procurement methods and the basis for selecting the 
preferred option.  
x DTF noted that the recommended non-fixed fee construction 
management model probably provides better value for money 
for this type of project, and that the Department of Health was 
retaining significant project risks and would need to manage 
the interfaces between different contractors and the extended 
staged program of works. 
Regional 
trains 
Not assured x The business case did not adequately justify the basis for the 
selection of the recommended procurement model—a single 
source approach to an existing supplier. 
x The primary justifications were time constraints, compatibility 
concerns and an asserted capacity to ensure value for money 
from the single source model.  
x The agency did not adequately address DTF's concerns 
about this procurement route.  
x DTF's final assessment supported the procurement approach 
primarily due to the time constraints and the mitigation of 
having an 'open book' arrangement with the supplier. 
x However, this assumed that the underlying core contract 
pricing was still competitive although it had not been market 
tested for more than 10 years.  
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Figure 3G 
Findings on business case analysis of procurement approaches – continued 
Project Assessment Reasons 
Western 
Highway 
Improving 
assurance 
x The first business case submitted did not adequately 
demonstrate that the procurement model—design and 
construct—would provide greater value for money.  
x DTF raised this, and VicRoads provided further 
explanations and evidence and incorporated this material in 
an amended business case.  
x While DTF was satisfied with the updated business case, it 
did not assess the procurement options against all 
evaluation criteria.  
RandL Not 
applicable 
x The procurement phase was completed well before the 
updated business case went through a HVHR type process. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
3.3.7 Further reviews using an updated template 
DTF analysts assessed the business cases for the five projects examined earlier in this 
section using a HVHR template dating from early 2012. DTF updated this template in 
November 2012. The scope of the HVHR business case reviews did not change over 
this time, but the updated template is better structured and provides analysts with more 
detailed guidance on questions to address when reviewing a business case. 
We conducted a rapid assessment of three further business cases to determine 
whether using the updated template had affected the quality of HVHR reviews for: 
x the Blackburn Road grade separation 
x the Kilmore–Wallan bypass 
x Southland station. 
We concluded that the new template did not materially change our findings and 
conclusions from the earlier analysis of five business cases. Our review of the three 
business cases that were assessed by DTF using an updated assessment template 
shows that opportunities remain to improve the depth and rigour of HVHR reviews. 
Consistent with our findings on the HVHR reviews of the initial sample of business 
cases, DTF applied the greatest scrutiny and achieved the highest level of assurance 
for project budgets, time lines and risk management.  
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When we reviewed the assessments of these further business cases against each of 
the deliverability criteria we found: 
x Deliver on budget—assurance about costs—DTF continues to mainly focus 
on scrutinising the cost of the recommended solution. 
x Deliver to planned time lines—DTF's level of inquiry is similar to that exercised 
using the initial template. The business case content was adequate for the 
Blackburn Road grade separation, but the material provided in the Kilmore 
Wallan bypass and Southland station business cases did not fully comply with the 
guidelines. 
x Deliver intended benefits—we again found that this is an area subject to 
minimal, if any, scrutiny by DTF. 
x Comprehensively manage risks—while DTF did focus its efforts on reviewing 
agencies' risk management, we are not fully assured about the adequacy of the 
risk identification and management material in the business cases for the 
Blackburn Road grade separation and Southland station projects. 
x Governance and project management—use of the updated template has not 
addressed our concern that DTF's HVHR assessments do not provide sufficient 
assurance about the adequacy of governance and project management.  
x Procure for best value for money—use of the updated template has not fully 
addressed our concern that DTF does not gain sufficient assurance that agencies 
adequately demonstrate the basis for selecting a preferred procurement 
approach. None of the business cases met this standard, and DTF only identified 
this as an issue for two of the projects—the Blackburn Road grade separation 
and Southland station. 
HVHR review of the Southland station project 
Southland station was included in, then withdrawn from, the HVHR process when DTF 
understood that the major issues affecting its deliverability had been resolved. 
However, there was no documented confirmation that the substantive deliverability 
issues raised in DTF's HVHR reviews had been satisfactorily resolved. This should 
have formed part of the close-out process. 
Building Southland station was a November 2010 election commitment and the 
government allocated $700 000 in the 2011–12 Budget to develop a business case.  
While the station cost falls well short of $100 million, the government included the 
project in the HVHR process because: 
x completion required access to land owned by the adjacent shopping centre 
x the actual scope and cost depended on negotiations with the shopping centre 
about how best to link it to the station and the size of the shopping centre's 
financial contribution to the project. 
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DTF reviewed versions of the business case in January 2012 and January 2013 
advising, on both occasions, that the project should not be considered for funding 
because of deficiencies in these business cases which included: 
x lack of clarity around the shopping centre's financial contribution 
x absence of an access agreement to allow construction risk to be effectively 
managed 
x insufficient detail around the costs, time lines, risk management, governance, 
procurement and project management. 
The government decided to include the project in the 2013–14 Budget, allocating 
funding in the central contingency, with its release subject to: 
x reaching agreement on the shopping centre's financial contribution and access 
x approval being secured under the HVHR process. 
In April 2014, the Treasurer approved release of funding for the project and its removal 
from the HVHR process based on confirmation that an access agreement had been 
reached with the owner of the shopping centre and that this did not involve any 
financial contribution from the owner. 
However, the business case had not been updated and subjected to further HVHR 
review to confirm that deficiencies identified in previous reviews had been satisfactorily 
addressed following resolution of the agreement with the owner of the shopping centre. 
3.4 Tendering and appointment reviews 
3.4.1 Introduction 
We used the Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk Guidelines to inform our 
review of DTF's HVHR assessments of tender documentation, the preferred bid 
decision and the final contract prior to sign-off. The assessments are meant to ensure 
that: 
x the preferred procurement approach is effectively implemented and translated 
into a contractual framework that continues to represent the best value for money 
x the risks of diminishing this outcome through unintended scope creep or a 
contractual form that diminishes the outcomes for the state are managed. 
The additional approval requirements for HVHR projects include reviews and 
Treasurer's approvals at the following stages: 
x expression of interest—prior to release 
x request for tender/proposal—prior to release 
x preferred bid selection—prior to announcement 
x final contract—prior to signing and any major variations. 
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The role of DTF is to analyse the documentation and advise the Treasurer, using high 
level guidance and a standard briefing format. However, in contrast to its analysis of 
business cases, DTF has not developed a detailed assessment template to guide 
reviews at these other stages. 
3.4.2 Overall findings 
We found evidence that DTF: 
x Completed the required reviews for all five projects, as required by the guidelines, 
except for the approval of the request for proposal document and contract review 
for regional trains. However, DTF adequately justified this because the Treasurer 
had approved the invitation of a single bidder through the procurement strategy 
document and the contract used was identical to that used for previous rolling 
stock procurements. 
x Actively engaged departments for each of these projects and asked a range of 
reasonable questions to which departments responded. 
For two of the five projects the same DTF staff were involved in both advising the 
Treasurer on HVHR procurement reviews and assessing the bid(s). For: 
x regional trains, the DTF analyst sat on the procurement panel and wrote the 
memos advising the Treasurer—these were reviewed by line management 
x the Eye and Ear Hospital, a DTF assistant director sat on the procurement panel 
and reviewed the memos advising the Treasurer. 
We understand that this advice was subject to input and review by DTF staff apart from 
the person with a potential conflict. However, potential conflicts should be documented, 
together with an approach to managing them. 
We found that in assessing expressions of interest, request for tenders, preferred bids 
and final contracts, DTF did not apply a consistent approach to examining the 
underpinning documents, such as procurement, probity, risk management and tender 
evaluation plans. Figure 3H shows our detailed findings on the procurement reviews. 
  
Impact of the High Value High Risk process 
Victorian Auditor-General's Report  Impact of Increased Scrutiny of High Value High Risk Projects        43 
  Figure 3H
Findings on HVHR procurement reviews  
Project Findings 
Mitcham 
Road 
x All reviews were completed as required and advice was provided to the Treasurer with 
clear evidence of DTF's input to the development of the procurement documents. 
x DTF raised issues about the practice of allowing contractors to work on preliminary cost 
estimates and constructability assessments and then compete for the main tender.  
x The Treasurer's approval releasing the tender documents noted that DTF would review 
the issue. DTF advised that it took action to ensure that all bidders on this project had 
access to exactly the same information about the tender.  
x DTF has recently released a draft guidance note on early contractor involvement and 
other collaborative procurement models that clearly indicates that contractors involved in 
the development of a business case should be precluded from bidding for development or 
delivery of the project. 
Eye and 
Ear 
Hospital 
x All reviews were completed as required and advice was provided to the Treasurer with 
clear evidence of DTF's input to the development of the procurement documents. 
Regional 
trains 
x The procurement method approved for this project involved a single source approach to 
an existing supplier of rolling stock being used on the regional rail network.  
x All except one of the approvals were completed as required and advice was provided to 
the Treasurer with clear evidence of DTF's input to the final procurement documents. 
x In terms of the exception, the Treasurer approved negotiations with a single bidder but did 
not approve the request for offer document sent to this bidder in July 2012, as required 
under HVHR. DTF explained that this involved seeking a proposal from a single supplier, 
and the Treasurer had approved the procurement strategy document. 
x In October 2012, the Treasurer approved the contract based on advice from DTF that it 
was identical to previous contracts. However, we have not seen evidence about how DTF 
determined this.  
x The Treasurer approved the purchase of 34 train carriages, consistent with an earlier 
funding decision by Cabinet. The cost was less than the funding allocated by the 
government, and in late November 2011 the government directed V/Line and Rolling 
Stock Holdings—the state—to amend the contract to purchase 40 carriages.  
x The Treasurer did not formally approve the revised contract as required under HVHR. The 
decision was made by the relevant ministers and communicated to Public Transport 
Victoria and DTF. DTF advised that the Treasurer was involved in this final 
decision-making process. 
x The speed of the decision meant the agency did not provide advice to government on the 
implications of this change for incremental operating costs. 
Western 
Highway 
x All reviews were completed as required and advice was provided to the Treasurer with 
clear evidence of DTF's input to the development of the procurement documents. 
x During the expressions of interest review DTF raised issues about the procurement 
approach in the business case and the completion date, in light of a revised project scope 
and cost. 
x VicRoads secured the Treasurer's approval to release the expressions of interest 
documents but subsequently decided to abandon the expressions of interest stage and 
go straight to request for tender. While the decision appears reasonable, VicRoads should 
have sought the Treasurer's approval to vary the process, but did not. 
x The Treasurer approved the outcome of the procurement process for this project and the 
awarding of the contract in March 2014. 
RandL x The commencement of this project significantly pre-dated the introduction of the HVHR 
process. As a result, the primary procurement activity did not undergo review and 
approval under the HVHR process. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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3.5 Registration and licensing system project 
3.5.1 Introduction 
We have dedicated this section to the RandL project because past management 
actions and oversight efforts have not stopped the realisation of significant delays and 
cost overruns. 
The project is meant to transform registration and licensing processes and the 
supporting information and communications technology (ICT) systems in order for 
VicRoads and other agencies that rely on these systems to: 
x improve data integrity and accessibility 
x improve efficiency, flexibility and responsiveness 
x put customers at the centre of the upgraded system 
x reduce the potential for fraud. 
Figure 3I shows the project's major milestones, describing: 
x the approval of a 2009–10 business case for the system costed at $173 million 
x how the project was paused in mid-2011 and restarted in late-2011 with a revised, 
approved cost of $158 million and a scheduled delivery of the entire system 
through a single phase deployment by mid-2014 
x how the project was paused again in early 2014 because the projected costs had 
increased to $293 million and the time lines extended by 18 months.  
3.5.2 Conclusion on RandL's management and oversight 
The management and oversight applied to RandL did not effectively foresee and 
control risks before they materialised to significantly delay the project and increase the 
estimated cost of delivery. VicRoads has proposed additional expenditure of up to 
$135 million more than the approved budget of $158 million to finish it. This would 
mean a total project cost of $293 million—85 per cent more than the approved budget 
of $158 million. 
The single most critical cause of these poor outcomes has been the absence of human 
resources with the skills and depth of experience needed to manage and oversee a 
project of this type and complexity. 
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 Critical gaps existed in three key areas—management, oversight and governance, 
and independent review—which did not detect and respond to the risks inherent in this 
type of project up to the middle of 2013 because:  
x VicRoads did not appoint a project director with sufficient ICT implementation 
experience until the middle of 2013. This new executive played a key role in 
understanding and starting to address this shortfall.  
x The board did not include sufficient ICT project deployment and business change 
experience until April 2013. 
x The review of the 2011 business case that informed DTF's advice to government 
on the continuation of the project in late 2011 did not adequately identify and 
assess the risks. 
VAGO's 2008 guide Investing Smarter in Public Sector ICT: Turning principles into 
practice clearly describes the need to understand the role of business process 
restructuring and the agency's capability to execute an ICT investment before finalising 
a business case. 
  Figure 3I
Key stages in the RandL project 
2009–10—business case and funding for initial design and procurement: 
x 2009–10 business case approved with estimated cost of $173 million 
x funding of $38.9 million—$15 million previous funding and new allocation of $23.9 million.  
July 2010—contract signed for design, implementation and operation: 
x progress beyond initial design subject to government approval and further funding. 
March to May 2011—design completed and project paused: 
x March 2011—initial core design considered substantially complete 
x May 2011—project put on hold, with DTF review to confirm scope and cost to complete.  
August 2011—DTF received consultant's review report: 
x DTF commissioned a review based on an updated business case with the same cost 
x consultant concluded the project had been well managed but raised the following concerns: 
x lack of a detailed plan for a single phased, rather than staged, implementation 
x existence of a number of outstanding change requests to the system design 
x lack of a clear data cleansing and migration plan (RandL team, not contractor responsibility) 
x consultant recognised that these concerns generated cost and time line uncertainties and 
recommended: 
x either pausing and addressing these now, or 
x proceeding with a 30–35 per cent contingency for a total cost of $175 to $182 million. 
November 2011—funding decision: 
x VicRoads requested total funds of $178.6 million for the project, including the $44 million spent 
to date, or an additional $89.6 million and $40 million in contingency funds 
x government approved $158.6 million funding, with $20 million contingency, requiring  
VicRoads to: 
x develop, and the Treasurer to approve, detailed plans for a single phase implementation 
and data cleansing and migration 
x assess and accurately cost change requests and strengthen its ICT management 
capability. 
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Figure 3I 
Key stages in the RandL project—continued 
2012–13—remobilising the project and addressing the funding conditions: 
x early 2012—project remobilised and work started on meeting the funding conditions 
x 9 July 2012—Treasurer approved the revised schedule for single phase implementation and 
VicRoads' Data Cleansing and Migration Strategy based on DTF's advice 
x March–April 2013—VicRoads employed an executive director for the Registration and 
Licensing area with direct experience of this type of transformation and an independent board 
member with expertise in ICT implementation 
x 25 May 2013—based on DTF's advice the Treasurer approved the release of $6.58 million 
from the project contingency to fund the project's remobilisation and unavoidable system 
changes. 
2013–14—Events leading to the second project pause: 
x June 2013—VicRoads forecast an 18-month delay in delivery and an emerging, significant 
funding gap, and DTF red flagged the project and commissioned a review 
x June–September 2013—VicRoads strengthened project governance by appointing a project 
director with significant ICT deployment and business change experience 
x February 2014—government paused the project based on DTF's advice that it would now, if 
continued, take at least a further 18 months and cost $293 million ($135 million over budget) 
because: 
x the 2011 business case and late 2011 Budget and Expenditure Review Committee 
submission significantly underestimated the time and costs required to complete the project 
x there had been inadequate engagement, especially during the design phase of the project, 
between the RandL project and other areas of VicRoads and also with external agencies 
x greater than expected design changes affected project complexity and delivery 
x VicRoads and DTF underestimated the skills and resources required to effectively manage 
and oversee a project of this type through to delivery. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on Department of Treasury and Finance and 
VicRoads documentation. 
3.5.3 Underpinning evidence 
RandL project complexity and challenges 
RandL is an ICT project where VicRoads is responsible for replacing the multiple 
systems used for road vehicle and marine recreational vessel licensing and 
registration.  
The current systems are old, difficult to use and expensive to maintain and modify, and 
they do not provide reliable data or adequate protection against fraud. They also 
constrain the government from making regulatory and policy changes and participating 
in national improvement initiatives. The Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure (DTPLI) advised that there have been system enhancements since 2011 
to mitigate these issues and risks. 
The term 'ICT' can be misleading because this type of project involves much more than 
specifying and purchasing new technology—it is a business transformation project 
where new technology and revised policies, practices and behaviours need to fit 
together if the project is to succeed. 
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Successfully delivering a project of this type and complexity requires capabilities and 
experience outside of VicRoads' core competencies around the planning, construction, 
maintenance and renewal of road-related infrastructure. Specifically, it requires: 
x expertise in specifying and procuring ICT hardware and software from major ICT 
vendors and managing the design and implementation of these systems  
x an understanding of current systems and practices and how to cost-effectively 
achieve intended outcomes through a combination of ICT investments and 
changes to policy, regulation and work practices  
x a successful track record in integrating business needs and constraints in every 
aspect of project development and delivery, and a good understanding of the 
planning, consultation and training needed to do this successfully. 
Overall finding—management and oversight gaps 
Our examination of the evidence shows that VicRoads and DTF put in place the type 
of management and oversight structures and processes expected for a major 
government investment. These included: 
x appointing an executive director and management team 
x regular project reporting 
x setting up a project board, with agency, DTF, Department of Premier and Cabinet, 
and independent representatives, as well as regular meetings to monitor 
progress 
x DTF reviews of the 2009–10 business case and the equivalent of a HVHR review 
of the updated 2011 business case 
x incorporating the project within the HVHR process from late 2011. 
However, these structures and processes failed to adequately comprehend and control 
risks before they materialised to significantly delay completion and increase the 
estimated cost well beyond the approved project budget. 
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DTF independent review, September 2013 
DTF commissioned a further review of the project, based on advice from VicRoads in 
June 2013 forecasting an 18 month delay in project delivery and an emerging, 
significant funding gap.  
The September 2013 independent review confirmed the serious weaknesses in the 
project's management and oversight up to this point by concluding that: 
x The approved budget and scope did not deliver a working solution because 
VicRoads estimated it needed $61 million more than the approved budget to 
cover the change requests, and this excluded a range of other cost risks. 
x The project was not as advanced as the project team though it was. When 
testing, deployment and change requests were considered, the project was only 
40 per cent complete, compared to the team's estimate that 85 per cent of the 
core solution had been built. 
x The poor definition of the project scope had led to change requests as more 
detailed analysis uncovered new requirements. The project was set up to replace 
legacy systems and streamline processes, but did not have a mandate to 
transform business operations. Without this mandate, change requests to 
replicate current processes had all been viewed as 'critical'. 
x There had been a lack of representation of VicRoads Information Management 
and Technology division within the governance structure, leading to a 
misalignment of the project to broader VicRoads strategies, limited expert 
scrutiny of contractors and limited consideration of the operational impacts of 
decisions and change requests. 
x There had been significant shortfalls in the project's management since 
remobilisation, particularly around system design validation, vendor management 
and project financial oversight. 
x There was a core skills gap with respect to vendor management and independent 
quality assurance. 
x There had been a lack of focus on strategic risk management. Sufficiently 
detailed information on risks, finances and schedule had not been provided to the 
project board, including information about the risks of a single stage deployment 
strategy. 
The review included recommendations that: 
x VicRoads analyse staged deployment options because a single phase 
deployment is too risky 
x VicRoads improve the clarity and transparency of the information provided to the 
project board about costs, risks, mitigations and vendor management issues 
x VicRoads engage an appropriately experienced project director and source an 
enterprise architect to advise on the deployment options 
x VicRoads, with the project board, revisit the project's governance regarding 
regular independent quality assurance reporting and the integration of VicRoads 
ICT functions and chief information officer into the project governance.  
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The September 2013 review contrasts with the August 2011 review, because the 
earlier review did not highlight issues with the team's capability, the design process or 
the choice of a single phase implementation. 
3.5.4 Lessons from the RandL experience 
The particular lessons from this project are not new but are worth reaffirming. 
Major ICT projects need to be approached as business transformation projects, not as 
siloed technology upgrades.  
This involves an end-to-end, holistic consideration of how to combine upgraded 
technology, revised legislation and policies and modified business processes to best 
meet the intended outcomes. The process must involve—from start to finish—all those 
connected to the changes, including partner agencies, employees and customers. 
Doing this effectively requires people who can bring this set of skills to manage, 
oversee and independently quality-assure these types of projects. This should affect 
the appointment of project directors, the composition of project boards and the 
appointment of consultants to do independent reviews.  
Ideally, each line of management and oversight should include people with a track 
record of delivering similar projects. 
3.5.5 Current status of RandL 
By the end of 2013 VicRoads had: 
x strengthened the project team and board by appointing appropriately experienced 
personnel 
x commissioned reviews to re-evaluate the project costs and risks and underpin 
these estimates for a more holistic approach to business transformation 
x worked up phased development options to mitigate the risks of a single phase 
development and to secure major beneficial changes as soon as possible. 
The DTPLI verified the options and estimated costs and time lines before submitting 
this material to government.  
The project is currently paused for one year from February 2014 to allow VicRoads to 
update the business case to further explore the options for delivering the project and 
working with DTPLI to investigate the potential for legislative reform to streamline 
service delivery. 
To the end of February 2014, a total of $102.4 million had been spent on RandL. 
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Recommendations 
That the Department of Treasury and Finance:  
7. provides greater assurance that High Value High Risk reviews comprehensively 
test compliance with its Investment Lifecycle and High Value High Risk 
Guidelines in areas critical for project deliverability 
8. checks that for complex, risky projects—particularly those involving information 
and communications technology transformations—the specialist skills needed to 
successfully manage, oversee and quality assure these projects have been 
assessed and acquired. 
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Appendix A. 
Audit Act 1994 section 16—
submissions and comments 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994, a copy of this report was 
provided to: 
x Department of Treasury and Finance 
x Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure 
x Department of Health 
x VicRoads 
x Public Transport Victoria. 
The submissions and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
Responses were received as follows:  
Department of Treasury and Finance .......................................................................... 52 
Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure ...................................... 56 
Department of Health .................................................................................................. 57 
VicRoads ..................................................................................................................... 58 
Public Transport Victoria ............................................................................................. 59 
 
  
Appendix A. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
52       Impact of Increased Scrutiny of High Value High Risk Projects Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance – 
continued 
   
Appendix A. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
54       Impact of Increased Scrutiny of High Value High Risk Projects Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Transport, Planning and 
Local Infrastructure 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Health 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive, VicRoads 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria 
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